Good Afternoon. I’m Debbie Hersman, Board Member with the National Transportation Safety Board. I’m accompanied today by the Vice Chairman of NTSB, Mr. Robert Sumwalt. I’m here to provide you an update on the progress that our team has made since I last briefed you.

There have been a number of questions about the crew, we have been able to obtain some preliminary information about the crew and their history. The Captain is 35, his date of hire is November 1999. His total hours 4700, hours in the CRJ at Comair 3,000 and his Pilot-in-Command 1567. And in the last 30 days, he had flown 56 hours.

The First Officer is 44 years old. His date of hire was March ‘02. His total time is 5424 hours and his time in the CRJ as Second-in-Command 3,564.

We conducted a number of interviews today and indeed some of our teams have actually already traveled and conducted interviews in the local area, and traveled to Cincinnati and are conducting interviews in Cincinnati. I wanted to provide you an update on one of the interviews that was conducted with a ramp worker by our Ops Group.

The ramp worker indicated that at 5:15 the crew checked in, they picked up their paperwork and they boarded an aircraft. They started an APU on aircraft 7824 and the ramp worker advised them they were not on the correct aircraft. They shut down the aircraft, they shut down the APU on 7824 and moved to aircraft 7472 and they conducted the pre-flight on the accident aircraft. At 5:30 the flight attendant boarded. At 5:40 checks were completed by the flight attendant. A couple of minutes later passengers began boarding. All passengers and cargo were loaded on time and the pre-flight walk-around by the ramp worker didn’t indicate any problems.

We conducted our taxi test last night. They were conducted in a similar CRJ provided by Comair. They taxied out on the path, following the path of the accident aircraft. They went from the ramp to Runway 26. They also returned and then taxied out to Runway 22. They did this several times and the tests occurred from about 10:30 to sometime between 12:30 and 1:00 in the morning last night. Our Operations, Human Performance and Airport Groups had representatives on board. They took turns taking views from the cockpit. They did some documentation, they took photos and they made observations. We had another team in the air traffic control tower. They wanted to see how the aircraft progressed down the taxiway, down the runway. They wanted to get a perspective to see what the visibility was and to see if they could follow the aircraft. As you know, Runway 26 has been closed and a NOTAM was issued since the accident that it has been closed. There’s been some effort to put some things up to show that Runway 26 is now closed at the airport.

Our air traffic control team conducted an interview this morning of the controller that was on duty at the time of the accident. The controller has been at this facility for 17 years. He was fully qualified to perform all air traffic control functions. He said the last time he saw the aircraft was when it was taxiing to Runway 22. It was on Taxiway Alpha in front of the tower. He cleared the aircraft for takeoff. He relayed to our investigators that the pilot did not sound confused or disoriented. He scanned the departure end of Runway 22, he looked at the approach end, he scanned the radar display and there was no traffic. He cleared the aircraft for takeoff and he expected the flight to take off from Runway 22.

At that point in time he turned around to perform administrative duties. He had cleared the aircraft for takeoff and he turned his back and performed administrative duties in the tower. At that point he was doing a traffic count. The controller said he had a clear, unobstructed view of the runway. And that is the information we have from the interview this morning.

I’d like to follow up on some information that we shared with you yesterday just to clarify. We told you that the First Officer was the flying pilot. The First Officer was the flying pilot of the accident flight, however, for those of you who may not be familiar with aviation operations, the Captain taxies the aircraft out on the taxiway and positions the aircraft on the runway. The reason he does that is because there is a tiller that allows him to drive the aircraft while it’s on the ground. The tiller is located on the Captain’s side only in this aircraft. So the Captain taxies the aircraft out and then he hands over the controls to the First Officer when the aircraft is lined up on the center line of the runway. The First Officer was the flying pilot yesterday, but there is a normal and standard division of duties between the two crew. I just wanted to clarify that information so you would have that.

There are some questions that you all asked me last night and I wanted to provide you some answers to those questions. We had a discussion about the call outs that were made and the speeds that were needed to achieve rotation. 135 knots is the rotation speed.

There were questions about whether or not the crew had ever come into Lexington before and what times the crew may have arrived in the day before. The Captain deadheaded, or he rode as a passenger, on an airplane that arrived in Lexington on 8/26 at 1530. The Captain had been into the airport in Lexington six times over the past two years and the most recent time that he had come in was in June. The First Officer came in as a member of a crew on Flight 9471, JFK to Lexington on 8/26 and that flight arrived at 0200. The First Officer had last been into Lexington in May and he has been in and out of Lexington 10 times in the last two years.

We are beginning to wrap up a number of things that we are doing on scene. We are beginning to close out some of our Groups. The Weather Group and the Power Plants Group have already completed their field notes, and they’ve been released. We have a number of other groups that may be wrapping up their work this evening and will be leaving. Our Operations Group and Human Performance Group has already left Lexington, they completed their local interview and they are in Cincinnati now. They are conducting interviews in Cincinnati and began doing that this afternoon. We also have someone who is a specialist in maintenance and they are now in Cincinnati reviewing maintenance records. We will continue to provide you information. I don’t believe we will have a briefing later on tonight, we may have another tomorrow. We will let you know if we will have one tomorrow. The NTSB, even when they leave scene, will provide additional updates, and those will be done through press releases. I’m happy to take any questions. Matt?

Question: Debbie, there is a confusion about the third crew member, who was not flying. Do you know if that person was in a jump seat or seated in the cabin?

Debbie: It was a non-revenue passenger, it was an AirTran pilot and they were in the cabin. They were not in the cockpit in the jump seat. They are called a jumpseater but they weren’t in the jumpseat. They were one of the counted 47 passengers.

Question: Debbie, do you know whether this plane stopped before takeoff, or did it roll from taxi to takeoff?

Debbie: The question was whether or not the aircraft stopped, they rolled through their taxi and to their takeoff.

Question: Straight roll then, they did not stop before beginning the takeoff roll then, correct?

Debbie: That is my understanding.

Question: As it relates to the controller who is in the tower, did he actually see the crash or a fireball, or how did he actually become aware of the accident?

Debbie: My understanding from the interview is that he became aware of the crash from an explosion and noise, he turned and at that point he had realized there had been an accident.

Question: So he did not actually see the plane lift off the runway?

Debbie: No. The controller had last seen the aircraft when he gave them the clearance to taxi, takeoff clearance, and they were on the taxiway.

Question: Was that a mistake on his part?

Debbie: We have interviewed the controller, we have information about what occurred. The decisions about what needs to be done, what needs to be changed, that’s all part of the NTSB’s analysis and won’t be conducted on-scene.

Question: Debbie, where on the taxiway was the plane at the time which this controller lost it...(inaudible) that. Taxiway.....is a long taxiway....(inaudible), can you clarify that?.

Debbie: It is my understanding that the aircraft was on Taxiway Alpha in front of the tower and that’s right prior to them making a left turn to go towards the runways.

Question: Ma’am, did the controller last see the plane....20 seconds he described ....acceleration ...(inaudible).

Debbie: I don’t know the exact time line of what the controller was doing. We do have definite information from our FDR and CVR, but it is very difficult to corroborate the time in the tower when it’s a recollection by the air traffic controller. I cannot tell you whether or not the 29 seconds on the CVR is reflective of that.

Question: When will the control tapes and the CVR tapes, the transcripts, become available?

Debbie: The FAA makes the decision about releasing the air traffic control tapes. The NTSB has the Cockpit Voice Recorder and we will not release the transcript of the CVR until the majority of our Factual Reports are completed. There is the potential that a public hearing could be held, a CVR transcript would be released at that time if we hold a public hearing or when a majority of the Factual Reports are completed.

Question: Is a controller required to have visual contact with the aircraft once it reaches the beginning of the runway? Is a controller required to do that?

Debbie: The fact of the matter is, this controller did not have visual contact with this aircraft. What we are going to be doing is requesting information from the FAA about guidance, rules, requirements and what is appropriate for visual contact with aircraft.

Question: Debbie, you said last night that at some point in the takeoff roll, there was conversation in the cockpit about noting that the lights were not on. Do you have any better understanding on where that took place on the takeoff roll, how early, and is there any other indication that they realized there was a problem?

Debbie: Bob I am sorry the answer to your question is no, I don’t have any more detail than what I provided to you about the Cockpit Voice Recorder. I think at some point that information will be known. The teams in Washington expect to finish their work on the transcription of the CVR as well as their work on the FDR. Those Groups will be done tomorrow.

Question: Do you have any information on what altitude the plane may have gotten to? Do you have information on how high it was?

Debbie: I don’t. The information I have is similar to what I gave you last night. The performance work that had been done. We have three tire tracks at the end of the runway. The airplane hit a berm and became airborne at that point in time. The measurements about that were depending on the GPS information that is being done, the FDR. the timeline. trying to coordinate all that and we haven’t accomplished that yet, Lisa.

Question: Do you have any idea, according to the ramp worker, why there might have been confusion about which aircraft, I mean did he talk about why the crew may have actually got into the wrong airplane? Or any thoughts about that?

Debbie: We are certainly trying to understand what happened in the morning of the accident. We are interviewing everyone who might be able to tell us something. The information that we have from the statement that the ramp worker provided to us is that they went to the wrong plane, they started the APU, he notified them that they were at the wrong plane, they then went to the correct plane and did the pre-flight. One of the things that we will try to look at is what might have caused the confusion, what the crew might have been looking at, whether or not this is something that is more widespread if there is a potential for confusion such like this.

Question: Do you have any idea about this fatigue issue? Do you have any knowledge right now what their schedule was from the time that they had come into the airport a day and a half or so, or a day previously?

Debbie: That’s part of the information that we are trying to reconstruct. As you know, 72 hours or more we want to look back. That is, we did have the opportunity to interview hotel individuals this morning, people who work at the hotel to try to determine about the crew, when they arrived, when they checked out, things like that. We will try to put together a very detailed history about what happened. As you know, fatigue has been a long standing issue for the NTSB, in all modes. And we will look at that. We don’t know about this accident yet.

Question: Did anybody see these pilots drinking the night before, or did anyone detect the day of, that there may have been alcohol involved, any unsteadiness, or...(inaudible) or anything like that?

Debbie: We have no reports about any of that. There are requirements that toxicology samples be taken and done. They are looking for alcohol and 6 illicit drugs.

Question: Did the team last night have any impressions of what the taxi was like to that runway, did they have any issues with the way that...

Debbie: Unfortunately, last night I was not in the cockpit, I was actually still here briefing you when some of the exercise began. And so I went over to the airport and I did have an opportunity to go up into the tower and observe things from the tower. I didn’t have a chance to experience from the cockpit so I can’t comment on that.

Question: Can you see the two runway ends clearly and discern the difference?

Debbie: Alan I am happy to share with you what I saw from the tower. I am not an Air Traffic Controller and I am not a pilot. And so I will share with you some of my observations. There were some questions yesterday about what whether of not there was any obstruction. There is a parking lot that’s in between the tower and Taxiway Alpha. But you can clearly see over the parking structure. I had a clear view to the taxiways and to the runways. The taxiways are lit up with blue lights. Runway 22 is lit up with white lights. Runway 26 is not lit, it is dark. The center line lights were not working, were not operational, as we discussed before, on Runway 22. There were no obstructions. I could see the aircraft as it was taxiing and as it was approaching the runways clearly.

Question: How long had the controller been on duty and what was his shift there like, the hours?

Debbie: I don’t have the answer to that question but I can find out and will get back to you.

Question: Just to clarify, the last time that the controller said he saw the plane it was taxiing onto 22, or actually lined up on 22?

Debbie: I’m sorry, can you repeat your question?

Question: The last time that the controller saw, had eye contact with the plane, was it taxiing to 22 or did he say or she say they saw it actually lined up on 22?

Debbie: The interview that was conducted today with the controller, the controller told our investigators that the last time that he saw the aircraft he had cleared the aircraft for Runway 22. When he turned away, the aircraft was on Taxiway Alpha.

Question: Just to clarify , cleared them for takeoff on 22?

Debbie: Yes. The aircraft had been directed to taxi to Runway 22 and then he gave a subsequent clearance for takeoff, which was acknowledged.

Question: Prior to Sunday, how many planes of similar capacity and size have traveled down 26?

Debbie: The question I am being asked is about Runway 26 and how many aircraft prior to Sunday had traveled down that runway. I can’t tell you exact numbers, about how many aircraft at Blue Grass Airport had traveled down Runway 26, but what I can tell you is that we have been advised that only 2% of the traffic at Blue Grass Airport uses Runway 26. Again, Runway 26, since October 2001, has been a daytime only, VFR, general aviation runway.

Question: How many aircraft departed Runway 22, using the correct runways prior to the accident airplane? The accident airplane was on 26 yesterday, correct?

Debbie: There were three aircraft that requested clearance for takeoff around 5:45. They were all directed to Runway 22. Two aircraft took off from Runway 22 prior to the accident aircraft.

Question: When the crew had entered the wrong aircraft, (inaudible) was that aircraft suitable for takeoff on Runway 26?

Debbie: The aircraft that the crew got on was not the proper aircraft for the flight that they needed to take. They got off that aircraft and got onto their assigned aircraft.

Question: Had that aircraft taken off from 26, would it have flown....?

Debbie: I don’t know. It was another CRJ. One more question.

Question: Are you all aware of any other instances in which an aircraft inadvertently at least started to make a takeoff on 26 and was caught before something happened?

Debbie: We are looking into any information that could provide us any clues if there have ever been any other circumstances like this. I mentioned the other night that we are looking into the ASRS. This is the incident reporting system run by NASA, to see if there is any history of any confusion. We will continue to talk to airport personnel, interview pilots and do the work that we need to do to collect information.

Question: When will the families be allowed to visit the site? Relatives?

Debbie: This is the last question. There is going to be a site visit tomorrow for the families. It is private. It is not open to press. There is also going to be a memorial service that the families are going to have that’s at a separate location. They’re going to have a site visit and then they are going to have a memorial service following the site visit.

Transcribed by Baum Hedlund for informational purposes only for your use on an "as is, as available" basis. Baum Hedlund assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions in this transcript.